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Abstract—We approach RFID privacy both from modelling
and protocol point of view. Our privacy model avoids the
drawbacks of several proposed RFID privacy models that either
suffer from insufficient generality or put forward unrealistic
assumptions regarding the adversary’s ability to corrupt tags.
Furthermore, our model can handle multiple readers and intro-
duces two new privacy notions to capture the recently discovered
insider attackers.
We analyse multiple existing RFID protocols, demonstrating
the easy applicability of our model, and propose a new wide-
forward-insider private RFID authentication protocol. This pro-
tocol provides sufficient privacy guarantees for most practical
applications and is the most efficient of its kind, it only requires
two scalar-EC point multiplications.
Index Terms—Computer security, authentication, privacy,
cryptography, RFID tags.
I. INTRODUCTION
As Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are
becoming more common (for example in access control,
product tracing, e-ticketing, electronic passports), managing
the associated privacy and security concerns becomes more
important [1]. Since RFID tags are primarily used for authen-
tication purposes, security in this context means that it should
be infeasible to impersonate a legitimate tag. Privacy, on the
other hand, means that unauthorized parties should not be able
to identify, trace, or link tag appearances.
For RFID tags used in consumer applications, an adversary
typically learns the outcome of the identification protocol, on
top of sending arbitrary queries to tags and getting responses.
Successful identifications result in an unlocked door, unlocked
car or processed payment; while failure has no outcome.
As low-cost devices, RFID tags are hardly protected against
physical tampering. In particular, it has been shown that side-
channel attacks may enable an adversary to extract secrets
from the tag [2], [3], [4]. Furthermore, by inducing power
drops or by otherwise influencing the physical environment of
the tag, so-called ‘reset’ attacks enable the adversary to force
the tag to re-use old randomness [5], [6], [7].
Several models for privacy and security in the context of
RFID systems have been proposed in the literature. Section III
discusses a selection of general models. For some of these
models we show that, despite their intended generality, it
remains unclear how to apply these to protocols other than the
protocol in the context of which they were proposed. Other
existing models do not allow for adversaries that corrupt tags.
So far, little attention has been paid to supporting multiple
readers. Most RFID models only take into account the limited
setting of one reader. Multiple readers occur for example when
using a single RFID card to access multiple disjoint security
systems (e.g. multiple buildings, printer systems, vending
machines). Supporting multiple readers, however severely
complicates the setup since it is more likely that one of
the readers will be compromised. This should not affect the
security of the tags authenticating to other uncompromised
readers. As such, sharing secrets among readers is impossible.
We present a new RFID privacy model in Sect. IV that is
robust in the sense that it can handle tampering with tags,
is easily applicable, general and can handle multiple readers.
Furthermore, we introduce two new privacy notions to also
cover the case where an adversary uses the internal state from
a corrupted tag to attack privacy of other tags. These ‘insider’
attacks were described by van Deursen and Radomirovic´ [8],
clearly showing that wide-forward1 private protocols are not
sufficient. At first glance wide-forward privacy seems to imply
that even when the outcome of protocol is known to the
adversary, all interactions of a tag up to the point of corruption
cannot be linked. However, it was shown for two wide-forward
private protocols, that the adversary can link uncorrupted tags,
when given the ability to learn the outcome of the protocol
and the state of one legitimate ‘insider’ tag.
Using this new model as a reference we evaluate the
privacy of several existing RFID protocols in Sect. V and
we design and evaluate a new wide-forward-insider private
RFID identification protocol in Sect. VI. An optimised version
of this protocol is discussed in Sect. VII. After listing some
implementation considerations for private RFID authentication
protocols in Sect. VIII, we compare the security, privacy
and performance features of our protocol with the discussed
previously proposed protocols. This not only validates our
new model, but also shows that our new optimised protocol
is the most efficient one, only requiring two scalar-EC point
multiplications.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. RFID System
Throughout this article we use a common model for RFID
systems, similar to the definitions introduced in [9], [10]. For
our model, we extend these definitions to allow for multiple
readers, unlike previously proposed models.
Definition 1 (RFID System). An RFID system consists of a set
of tags T and a set of readers R. Each tag is identified by an
identifier ID. The memory of the tags contains a state S, which
may change during the lifetime of the tag. The tag’s ID may or
may not be stored in S. Each tag is a transponder with limited
memory and computation capability. A reader Rj consists of
1An overview of the different privacy notions is given in Sect. III
2one or more transceivers and a database. A reader’s task is
to identify legitimate tags (i.e. to recover their IDs), and to
reject all other incoming communication. Each reader has a
database that contains for every tag Ti, its ID and a matching
secret KRj,Ti . The secret KRj,Ti is specific for every tag and
can be different for every tag-reader combination. A tag is
‘registered’ with a reader if the reader database contains an
entry for that tag and can successfully authenticate it.
In general, an RFID system requires several algorithms and
protocols for setting up the readers, tags, registering tags with
readers or even unregistrering tags. These routines are highly
dependent on the specific layout of the RFID system and can
even take place offline. The privacy and security of these setup
and registration algorithms and protocols is thus outside of the
scope of this article. During the remainder of the article we
will only discuss the main protocol used for tag identification
and none of the auxiliary setup and registration routines.
B. Notation
If T is a set, t ∈R T means that t is chosen uniformly at
random from T . |T | denotes the cardinality of the set. If A is
an algorithm and O an oracle, then AO denotes the fact that
A has access to the oracle O.
Our proposed protocol is based on Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography, hence we make use of additive notation. Points on
the curve are represented by capital letters while scalars are
represented by lowercase letters.
The xcoord(·) function comes almost for free when using
elliptic curves. Assuming an elliptic curve E with prime order
ℓ over Fp, then for a point Q = {qx, qy} with qx, qy ∈
[0 . . . p− 1], xcoord(Q) maps Q to qx mod ℓ.
A function f : N → R is called ‘polynomial’ in the security
parameter k ∈ N if f(k) = O(kn), with n ∈ N. It is called
‘negligible’ if, for every c ∈ N there exists an integer kc
such that f(k) ≤ k−c for all k > kc. We denote a negligible
function by ǫ.
C. Number-theoretical Assumptions
1) Discrete Logarithm: Let P be a generator of a group Gℓ
of order ℓ and let A be a given arbitrary element of Gℓ. The
discrete logarithm (DL) problem is to find the unique integer
a ∈ Zℓ such that A = aP . The DL assumption states that it
is computationally hard to solve the DL problem.
2) One More Discrete Logarithm: The one more discrete
logarithm (OMDL) problem was introduced by Bellare [11].
Let P be a generator of a group Gℓ of order ℓ. Let O1()
be an oracle that returns random elements Ai = aiP of Gℓ.
Let O2(·) be an oracle that returns the discrete logarithm of
a given input base P . The OMDL problem is to return the
discrete logarithms for each of the elements obtained from the
m queries to O1(), while making strictly less than m queries
to O2(·) (with m > 0).
3) x-Logarithm: Brown and Gjøsteen [12] introduced the
x-Logarithm (XL) problem: given an elliptic curve point,
determine whether its discrete logarithm is congruent to the
x-coordinate of an elliptic curve point. The XL assumption
states that it is computationally hard to solve the XL problem.
Brown and Gjøsteen also provided some evidence that the XL
problem is almost as hard as the DDH problem.
4) Diffie-Hellman: Let P be a generator of a group Gℓ
of order ℓ and let aP, bP be two given arbitrary elements of
Gℓ, with a, b ∈ Zℓ. The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem is, given P, aP and bP , to find abP . The 4-tuple
〈P, aP, bP, abP 〉 is called a Diffie-Hellman tuple. Given a
fourth element cP ∈ Gℓ, the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem is to determine if 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 is a valid Diffie-
Hellman tuple or not.
5) Oracle Diffie-Hellman: Abdalla et al. [13] introduced
the ODH assumption:
Definition 2. Oracle Diffie-Hellman (ODH) Given A =
aP,B = bP , a function H and an adversary A, consider
the following experiments:
Experiment ExpodhH,A :
• O(Z) := H(bZ) for Z 6= ±A
• g = AO(·)(A,B,H(C))
• Return g
The value C is equal to abP for the Expodh−realH,A
experiment, chosen at random in Gℓ for the
Expodh−randomH,A experiment.
We define the advantage of A violating the ODH assumption
as:
|Pr
[
Expodh−realH,A = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expodh−randomH,A = 1
]
| .
The ODH assumption consists of the plain DDH assumption
combined with an additional assumption on the function H(·).
The idea is to give the adversary access to an oracle O
that computes bZ , without giving the adversary the ability to
compute bA, which can then be compared with C. To achieve
this one restricts the oracle to Z 6= ±A, and moreover, only
H(bZ) instead of bZ is released, to prevent the adversary
from exploiting the self-reducibility of the DL problem.2 The
crucial property that is required for H(·) is one-wayness.
III. EXISTING PRIVACY MODELS
This section discusses certain existing RFID privacy mod-
els. These models usually consist of a correctness (no false
negatives), security (no false positives) and privacy definition.
Note that covering all existing models would exceed the
scope of this article by far. Many models, including the ones
introduced in [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19] do not allow
corrupted tags to be traced. We have selected one such model,
i.e. Juels-Weis [19], for further discussion, in addition to the
stronger models of Vaudenay [9] and Canard et al. [10].
A. Vaudenay
Several concepts from the privacy model introduced by
Vaudenay [9] are used in our model. Therefore, we present
this model in detail.
2The adversary can set Z = rA for known r and compute r−1(bZ) = bA.
31) Adversarial model: The adversary has the ability to
influence all communication between a tag and the reader
and can therefore perform man-in-the-middle attacks on any
tag within its range. It may also obtain the result of the
authentication of a tag, i.e. whether the reader accepts or
rejects the tag. The adversary may also ‘draw’ (at random) tags
and then ‘free’ them again, moving them inside and outside its
range. During these interactions the adversary is given a virtual
reference vtag (not the tag’s real reference Ti) in order to refer
to the tags that are inside its range. Finally the adversary may
corrupt tags, thereby learning their entire internal state.
The above interactions take place over eight ora-
cles that the adversary may invoke: CreateTag(ID),
DrawTag(distr) → (vtag) , Free(vtag), Launch →
π, SendReader(m,π)→ m′, SendTag(m, vtag)→ m′,
Result(π) → x and Corrupt(vtag). Let vtag denote a
virtual tag reference, π a protocol instance, distr a polyno-
mially bounded sampling algorithm, m and m′ messages and
ID the tag’s identifier. For a complete definition of the oracles
the reader is referred to [9].
The Vaudenay model divides adversaries into different
classes, depending on restrictions regarding their use of the
above the oracles. In particular, a strong adversary may use all
eight oracles without any restrictions. A destructive adversary
is not allowed to interact with a tag after it has been corrupted.
This models situations where corrupting a tag leads to the
destruction of the tag. A forward adversary can only do other
corruptions after the first corruption. That is, no protocol
interactions are allowed after the first call to the Corrupt
oracle. A weak adversary does not have the ability to corrupt
tags. Orthogonal to these four attacker classes there is the
notion of wide and narrow adversary. A wide adversary has
access to the result of the verification by the server while
a narrow adversary does not. The most important relations
between the above privacy notions are given below:
wide-strong ⇒ wide-destructive ⇒ wide-forward ⇒ wide-weak
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
narrow-strong ⇒ narrow-destructive ⇒ narrow-forward ⇒ narrow-weak
In this case A⇒ B means that if the protocol is A-private it
implies that the protocol is B-private. A protocol that is wide-
strong private, for example, obviously also belongs to all other
privacy classes, that only allow weaker adversaries.
Due to their generality, the above restrictions can be used
perfectly in other privacy models. Throughout the article we
will frequently refer to strong, destructive, forward, weak and
wide/narrow adversaries.
2) Privacy, security and correctness: Privacy is defined by
means of the notion of a ‘trivial’ adversary. Intuitively, a trivial
adversary does not ‘use’ the communication captured during
the protocol run to determine its output.
Definition 3 (Blinder, trivial adversary - <Simplified> Def. 7
from [9]). A Blinder B for an adversary A is a polynomial-
time algorithm which sees the messages that A sends and re-
ceives, and simulates the Launch, SendReader, SendTag
and Result oracles to A. The blinder does not have access
to the reader tapes. A blinded adversary AB is an adversary
who does not use the Launch, SendReader, SendTag and
Result oracles.
An adversary A is trivial if there exists a blinder B such
that |Pr(Awins)− Pr(AB wins)| is negligible.
Intuitively, an adversary is called trivial if, even when
blinded, it still produces the same output. Such an adversary
does not ‘use’ the communication captured during the protocol
run in order to determine its output. Note that a blinded
adversary is not the same as a simulator typically found in
security proofs: the blinder is separate from the adversary and
has no access to the adversary’s tape. The blinder just receives
incoming queries from the adversary and has to respond either
by itself or by forwarding the queries to the system. We are
now ready to present the privacy definition.
Definition 4 (Privacy - <Simplified> Def. 6 from [9]).
The privacy game between the challenger and the adversary
consists of two phases:
1) Attack phase: the adversary issues oracle queries ac-
cording to applicable restrictions.
2) Analysis phase: the adversary receives the table that
maps every vtag to a real tag ID. Then it outputs true
or false.
The adversary wins if it outputs true. A protocol is called
X-private, where X is an adversary class (strong, destructive,
. . . ), if and only if all winning adversaries that belong to the
class X are trivial.
Besides privacy the protocol should also offer authentication
of the tag. We refer to this property as the security of the
protocol.
Definition 5 (Security - <Simplified> Def. 4 from [9]). We
consider any adversary in the class strong. The adversary wins
if the reader identifies an uncorrupted legitimate tag, but the
tag and the reader did not have a matching conversation. The
RFID scheme is called secure if the success probability of any
such adversary is negligible.
Definition 6 (Correctness - Def. 1 from [9]). An RFID
scheme is correct if its output is correct except with negligible
probability for any polynomial-time experiment which can be
described as follows:
1) Set up the reader.
2) Create a number of tags including one named ID.
3) Execute a complete protocol between reader and tag
ID.
The output is correct if and only if Output =⊥ and tag ID
is not legitimate or Output = ID and tag ID is legitimate.
In a follow-up paper by Paise and Vaudenay [20], the
concept of mutual authentication for RFID is defined. The tag
simply outputs a boolean, indicating whether or not the reader
was accepted. The authors extend the security definition by
adding a criterion for reader authentication.
3) Discussion: The paper of Vaudenay inspired many au-
thors to formulate derived RFID privacy models or to evaluate
the (Paise-)Vaudenay model [10], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24].
Although Vaudenay’s privacy model is perhaps the strongest
and most complete, it contains some flaws with respect to
strong privacy.
4Vaudenay’s proof of the statement that “wide-strong privacy
is impossible” uncovers some of these flaws. This proof
assumes a wide-destructive private protocol. By definition,
for every destructive adversary, there exists a blinder. This
includes the adversary that (a) creates one real tag, (b) corrupts
this tag right away, (c) starts a protocol using either the state
from the corrupted tag or from another fake tag. In the end,
the blinder has to answer the Result oracle. Obviously, the
adversary knows which tag was selected and knows which
result to expect. However, since the blinder has no access
to this random coin of the adversary, it must be able to
distinguish a real and a fake tag just by looking at the protocol
run from the side of the reader. The proof then uses this
blinder to construct a wide-strong adversary. Since all wide-
strong adversaries are also wide-destructive, this proves the
impossibility of wide-strong privacy.
Obviously, this proof only works because the blinder is
separated from the adversary. The issue with a separate blinder
is exploited multiple times by Armknecht et al. [25] in the
Paise-Vaudenay [20] model. Using this property the authors
show the impossibility of reader authentication combined with
respectively narrow forward privacy (if Corrupt reveals
the temporary state of tags) and narrow strong privacy (if
Corrupt only reveals the permanent state of tags). In later
work [26], Ouafi and Vaudenay correct the inconsistency in
the model and shows that strong privacy is indeed possible. In
this new approach, the blinder is given access to the random
coin flips of the adversary.
Independent from this correction, Ng et al. [21] also
identified the problems with strong privacy. They propose a
solution, based on the concept of a ‘wise’ adversary that
does not make any ‘irrelevant’ queries to the oracles i.e.
queries to which it already knows the answer. The authors
claim that, if the protocol does not generate false negatives,
then a wise adversary never calls the Result oracle. Given
the vague definition of wise adversaries it is hard to verify
these claims. The existence of attacks which exploit false
positives [27] however, suggests that the general claim that
Result is not used by a wise adversary is incorrect. Based
on this questionable general claim, the authors further identify
an IND-CPA-based protocol as being strong private, without
giving a formal proof.3
B. Canard et al.
1) Model: The model of Canard et al. [10] builds on the
work of Vaudenay, so the definition of oracles is quite similar.
For the privacy definition the model requires the adversary to
produce a non-obvious link between virtual tags.
Definition 7. (vtagi, vtagj) is a non-obvious link if vtagi and
vtagj refer to the same ID and if a ‘dummy’ adversary, who
only has access to CreateTag, Draw, Free, Corrupt, is
not able to output this link with a probability better than 1/2.
The definition requires the adversary to output a non-
obvious link to win the privacy game. A protocol is said
3Note that the original security proof (i.e. no false positives) by Vaudenay
requires IND-CCA2 encryption, so using only IND-CPA encryption would
require a new security proof. Result may serve as a decryption oracle.
to be untraceable if, for every adversary A, it is possible to
construct a ‘dummy’ adversary Ad such that |SuccUntA (1k)−
SuccUntAd (1
k)| ≤ ǫ(k).
It is unclear why the authors use the probability threshold
1/2, since one would expect some dependency on the total
number of non-obvious links.4
One major difference with respect to Vaudenay’s model
is that a ‘dummy’ adversary is used instead of a blinded
adversary. This avoids some of the issues surrounding the
use of a blinder, because a ‘dummy’ adversary can also
access its own random tape, while a blinder cannot access
the adversary’s random tape.
2) Discussion: While the work certainly has its merit in
formalizing and fixing the Vaudenay model (by using a dummy
adversary instead of a blinder), the model of Canard et al. lacks
generality because it focuses on non-trivial links. Moreover the
above definitions are circular: the definition of a non-obvious
link refers to a dummy adversary, which on its turn is defined
in terms of the probability of outputting a non-obvious link.
In its current form, without changing any definition to break
the circularity, the model is not useable.
C. Juels-Weis
1) Model: The model by Juels and Weis [19] is based on
the notion of indistinguishability. The model does not feature
a DrawTag query and the Corrupt query is replaced by a
SetKey query, which returns the current secret of the tag and
allows the adversary to set a new secret. Figure 1 shows a sim-
plified version of the privacy game. The protocol is considered
private if ∀A, Pr
[
Exp
priv
A,S guesses b correctly
]
≤ 12 + ǫ.
Experiment Exppriv
A,S
:
1) Setup:
• Generate n random keys keyi .
• Initialize the reader with the random keyi .
• Create n tags, each with a keyi .
2) Phase (1): Learning
• A can interact with a polynomial number of calls to the system, but can
only issue SetKey on n− 2 tags, leaving at least 2 uncorrupted tags
3) Phase (2): Challenge
• A selects two uncorrupted tags T0 and T1 . Both are removed from the
set of tags.
• One of these tags (Tb , the challenge tag) will be selected at random by
the challenger.
• A can make a polynomial number of calls to the system, but cannot
corrupt the challenge tag Tb .
• A outputs a guess bit g ∈ {0, 1}.
Figure 1. Privacy experiment from Juels-Weis
2) Discussion: The Juels-Weis model is one of the few
models that are based on a indistinguishability game instead
of the notion of simulatability. The model is limited by the
fact that the challenge tags cannot be corrupted. In terms of
the Vaudenay model [9] it would be a weak adversary with
regard to the challenge tags. For example, attacks in which the
adversary links together executions of a tag that have taken
place prior to its corruption are not possible in the Juels-Weis
model because of this.
4One slightly different interpretation is that a ‘dummy’ adversary cannot
determine if a given non-obvious candidate link vtagi, vtagj is a link in
reality or not. This interpretation however contradicts the definition of the
success probability of an adversary given in the paper.
5The model from Ha et al. [18] is very similar, with the
difference that the privacy is defined as distinguishing the reply
from a real tag from a random reply.
D. Bohli-Pashalidis
1) Model: Unlike the previous models, the Bohli-
Pashalidis[28] model is not an RFID-specific model. Unfor-
tunately, it captures only privacy properties; properties like
security and correctness are not covered. The model considers
a set of users (with unique identifiers) U , whose size is at least
polynomial in a security parameter. There is no formal differ-
ence between different types of players, like there is with tag
and reader in most RFID models. The system S can be invoked
with input batches (u1, α1), (u2, α2), . . . , (uc, αc) ∈ (U , A)c,
consisting of pairs of user identifiers and ‘parameters’ and
will output a batch ((e1, . . . ec), β), with the outputs ei from
each system invocation and a general output β, applying to
the batch as a whole. Users can also be corrupted, revealing
their internal state to the adversary.
The authors investigate the properties of the function f ∈
F , where F = {f : {1, 2, . . . , n} → U} is the space of
functions that map the serial number of each output element
to the user it corresponds to. In the Strong Anonymity (SA)
setting, no information should be revealed to the adversary
about the function f , guaranteeing the highest level of privacy.
Several weaker notions (which reveal some information on f )
are defined and the relations among notions are examined.
The adversarial model is based on indistinguishability. The
adversary can cause different users to invoke the system using
different parameters (e.g. messages) in both a left and right
world with the Input((u0, α0), (u1, α1)) oracle. Based on a
bit b, selected by the challenger, the system will be invoked
with the user-data pair (ub, αb). That is, the adversary itself
defines the functions f0, f1 ∈ F , for respectively the left and
right world. The adversary can also corrupt users. At the end
of the game the adversary has to output a guess bit g. The
adversary wins the game if g = b. By imposing restrictions
on f0 and f1, the authors investigate different levels of privacy.
Definition 8. A privacy protecting system S is said to uncondi-
tionally provide privacy notion X , if and only if the adversary
A is restricted to invocations (u0, α0) and (u1, α1) such that
f0 and f1 are X-indistinguishable for all invocations and for
all such adversaries A, it holds that AdvXS,A(k) = 0.
2) Discussion: Due to its generality, and due to the fact
that it is not meant to cover security properties, the Bohli-
Pashalidis model needs non-trivial adaptations in order to
apply to RFID setting. In its current form, the model does
not support multi-pass protocols, where linking two messages
from the same protocol run is not a privacy breach. Moreover
there is no distinction between tags that need to be protected,
and the reader for which privacy is not an issue. An interesting
question is whether the strictly binary distinguishing game
(only one bit of randomness in the challenge) provides enough
flexibility compared to other models, like Vaudenay’s, where
there are multiple bits of randomness that are to be guessed.
IV. OUR MODEL
A. Adversarial Model
We assume a set of readers R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rj} and a
set of tags T = {T1, T2, . . . , Ti}. R and T are initially empty,
and readers and tags are added dynamically by the adversary.
Each reader maintains a database of tuples (IDi,Ki), one for
every tag Ti ∈ T that is registered with that reader. Moreover,
every tag Ti stores an internal state Si.
Let A denote the adversary, which can adaptively control
the system S. A interacts with S through a set of oracles. The
experiment that the challenger sets up for A (after the security
parameter k is fixed) proceeds as follows:
ExpS,A(k):
1) b ∈R {0, 1}
2) g ← AO()
3) Return g == b.
At the beginning of the experiment, the challenger picks a
random bit b. The adversary A subsequently interacts with
the challenger by means of the set of oracles O:
• CreateReader() → Rj : this oracle creates a new
reader. A reference Rj to the new reader is returned.
• CreateTag(ID) → Ti: on input a tag identifier ID,
this oracle calls SetupTag(ID) and registers the new tag
with the server. A reference Ti to the new tag is returned.
Note that this does not reject duplicate IDs.
• RegisterTag(Ti,Rj): register the tag Ti with the
server Rj . The registration of the tag with the reader can
be done in several ways (e.g. using a specific protocol
that involves both the tag and reader, between readers or
using some offline process).
• Launch(Rj) → π: a new protocol run is launched on
the reader Rj , according to the protocol specification. It
returns a session identifier π, generated by the reader.
• DrawTag(Ti,Tj) → vtag: on input a pair of tag
references, this oracle generates a virtual tag reference,
as a monotonic counter, vtag and stores the triple
(vtag, Ti, Tj) in a table D. Depending on the value of b,
vtag either refers to Ti or Tj . If one of the two tags Ti
or Tj is in the list of insider tags I, ⊥ is returned and no
entry is added to D. If Ti is registered with a different
set of readers than Tj , ⊥ is returned. If Ti is already
references as the left-side tag in D or Tj as the right-side
tag, then this oracle also returns ⊥ and adds no entry
to D. Otherwise, it returns vtag.
• Free(vtag)b: on input vtag, this oracle retrieves the
triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) from the table D. It resets either
Ti (if b = 0) or Tj (if b = 1). Then it removes
the entry (vtag, Ti, Tj) from D. When a tag is reset,
its volatile memory is erased. The non-volatile memory,
which contains the state S, is preserved.
• SendTag(vtag,m)b → m′: on input vtag, this oracle
retrieves the triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) from the table D and
sends the message m to either Ti (if b = 0) or Tj (if
b = 1). It returns the reply from the tag (m′). If the
above triple is not found in D, it returns ⊥.
• SendReader(Rj, π, m) → m′: on input π,m this
oracle sends the message m to the reader Rj in session π
6and returns the reply m′ from the reader (if any) is
returned by the oracle. 5
• Result(Rj,π): on input π, this oracle returns a bit
indicating whether or not the reader accepted session π
as a protocol run that resulted in successful authentication
of a tag. If the session with identifier π is not yet finished,
or there exists no session with identifier π, ⊥ is returned.
• Corrupt(Ti): on input a tag reference Ti, this oracle
returns the complete internal state of Ti. Note that the
adversary is not given control over Ti.
• CreateInsider(ID) → Ti, S: create an insider tag
Ti. This runs CreateTag to create a new tag Ti and
Corrupt on the newly created tag. The tag Ti is added
to the list I of insider tags.
• CorruptReader(Rj): corrupt the reader Rj , which
returns the full database of the reader and all secrets of the
reader. Note that in the default privacy game this oracle
is not used.
According to the above experiment description, the chal-
lenger presents to the adversary the system where either the
‘left’ tags Ti (if b = 0) or the ‘right’ tags Tj (if b = 1) are
selected when returning a virtual tag reference in DrawTag.
A queries the oracles a number of times and, subsequently,
outputs a guess bit g. We say that A wins the privacy game
if and only if g = b, i.e. if it correctly identifies which of the
worlds was active. The advantage of the adversary AdvS,A(k)
is defined as∣∣Pr [Exp0S,A(k) = 1]+ Pr [Exp1S,A(k) = 1]− 1∣∣ .
Restrictions on tag corruption: In the current setup
Corrupt(Ti) reveals the full internal state of the tag, i.e.
both its volatile and non-volatile parts. This follows [25] where
it is shown that, if corruptions reveal the volatile state, then the
resulting privacy notions are stronger. Single-pass protocols
(e.g. challenge-response) do not suffer from any issues, since
the volatile memory is typically erased after sending the reply,
and hence all computations are confined to the invocation of
the SendTag oracle. Multi-pass protocols on the contrary,
typically require storage of data in between SendTag in-
vocations. In this case, corrupting a tag in between protocol
passes always reveals the activity of the tag and thus allows
trivial attacks on the privacy of the tag. In this case, additional
restrictions in the privacy model are required to achieve a
reasonable privacy definition for such protocols. Note that
mutual authentication always requires a multi-pass protocol.
We assume that corrupting a tag implies some kind of
physical access to the tag. Such physical access would almost
certainly be disruptive for any active protocols being executed
on the tag at the time of corruption (if not, one would also
need to consider white-box or leakage-resilient cryptography).
Clearly corruption on itself should not yield any advantage
to an adversary. For instance, an adversary is could randomly
draw one out of two tags and execute several corruptions
in between protocol runs while the tag is drawn to see
if the selected tag is active. Such an adversary behaviour
would also contradict the assumption that physical access is
5If no active session pi exists, the reader is likely to return ⊥.
required: drawing a tag at random models the observation of
tags passing in proximity of the adversary. The moment an
adversary corrupts a tag it breaches the (possible) privacy of
such a tag and can certainly identify the tag based on physical
properties of the tag or the attached item. Hence it makes no
sence to allow corruption of a drawn tag since an adversary
should directly select such a tag instead of drawing it. For
the remainder of this article we will therefore restrict the
Corrupt oracle to inactive tags, i.e. tags that are drawn in
neither the left or right world.
B. Privacy
The adversary restrictions, as defined in Sect. III-A, also
apply to our privacy definition. Depending on the accept-
able usage of the Corrupt oracle, an adversary in our
model is either strong, destructive (Corrupt destroys a tag),
forward (after the first Corrupt only further corruptions
are allowed), or weak (no Corrupt oracle) adversaries.
Depending on the allowed usage of the Result oracle,
there exist narrow (no Result oracle) and wide adversaries.
If an adversary is allowed to call CreateInsider the
privacy notion is called ‘insider’, so we can speak of forward-
insider and weak-insider adversaries. For strong and destruc-
tive the CreateInsider can be simulated using the normal
CreateTag and Corrupt oracles, i.e. strong-insider and
destructive-insider are equivalent to strong and destructive
respectively. An overview of the relations between the privacy
notions, including our two new notions, is given below:
wide-forward-insider ⇒ wide-weak-insider
⇒ ⇓ ⇓
wide-strong ⇒ wide-destructive ⇒ wide-forward ⇒ wide-weak
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
narrow-strong ⇒ narrow-destructive ⇒ narrow-forward ⇒ narrow-weak
For most practical applications, wide-forward-insider pri-
vacy is sufficient. By contrast, the weaker notion of wide-
forward privacy is not sufficient; indeed, in e.g., transporta-
tion systems an adversary has easy access to an insider tag
and can thus abuse any privacy guarantees of the system.
Furthermore, it seems that the wide-strong notion captures
a scenario exceeding the practical requirements for privacy,
where an adversary may first corrupt a tag and then release
it again for future tracking. In practice this can be done more
easily, without physically tampering with the tag itself (i.e.,
corrupting it), e.g., by attaching a tracking device to the tag.
We now present our definition of privacy. X is used to
denote one of the above privacy notions. For the remainder
of this article, we will only consider computational privacy.
Definition 9 (Privacy). An RFID system S, is said to un-
conditionally provide privacy notion X , if and only if for all
adversaries A of type X , it holds that AdvXS,A(k) = 0. Simi-
larly, we speak of computational privacy if for all polynomial
time adversaries, AdvXS,A(k) ≤ ǫ(k).
C. Stateful protocols
Note that stateful protocols (which update their state after a
protocol run) do not satisfy our privacy definition. By issuing
a Corrupt(Ti) query before and after a protocol run, one
can always identify whether or not the tag has been active.
7The main solution we propose is to perform a (possibly
random) number of protocol executions on both tags Ti and
Tj when Free is called. This models the protocol executions
that happen outside of the adversaries range, i.e. when a tag
is free. These executions are crucial to re-randomize the state
of the tag such that consecutive corruption of the tag does not
reveal any information.
As an alternative we also mention the X+ privacy notions,
as defined in [28] which can be combined with the first
restriction from above. Simply put, this restriction implies that,
whenever a tag is corrupted at some point during the privacy
game, it always has to be drawn simultaniously in both the
left and the right world using a DrawTag(Ti, Ti) query with
identical arguments.
D. Correctness and soundness
Correctness ensures that a legitimate tag is always accepted
by a reader. Soundness is the property that an illegitimate tag
is not accepted by the server. Specifically for the RFID setting,
the RFID tag can only participate in one session at the time,
hence concurrent attacks on the tag are impossible. This allows
us to relax the security definition from requiring matching
conversations to impersonation resistance as in [23]. The
adversary cannot interact with the tag they try to impersonate
during the protocol run between adversary and reader.
Definition 10. Correctness. A scheme is correct if the identifi-
cation of a legitimate tag only fails with negligible probability.
Definition 11. Soundness. A scheme is resistant against imper-
sonation attacks if no polynomially bounded strong adversary
succeeds, with non-negligible probability, in being identified by
a verifier as the tag it impersonates. Adversaries may interact
with the tag they want to impersonate prior to, and with all
other tags prior to and during the protocol run. All tags, except
the impersonated tag, can be corrupted by the adversary.
Definition 12. Extended Soundness. Identical to Def. 11, but
the adversary is given access to the CorruptReader oracle.
E. Motivation and comparison
Our proposed model is based on the well-studied notion
of (left-or-right) indistinguishability, thus avoiding the issues
with less well-studied concepts such as blinders that the
Vaudenay model suffers from (see Sect. III-A). Moreover,
several cryptographic schemes have proven security properties
based on indistinguishability games (e.g. IND-CPA, IND-
CCA, IND-CCA2...). When using these schemes as building
blocks for private RFID authentication protocols, it is likely
to simplify proofs using our model.
Note that the Juels-Weis model from Sect. III-C also uses
a traditional indistinguishability setup. However, the model
requires the adversary to distinguish one out of two selected
tags in the final phase. The disadvantage of this approach is
that it does not take into account other properties that might
leak privacy and that it limits the use of tag corruption. The
Vaudenay model did introduce some crucial tools like virtual
tag references and the corruption types that are still required.
Modelling details:
• The introduction of CreateTag(·): since the set of tags
is not predefined we allow the adversary to dynamically
create new tags.
• DrawTag(·, ·) and Free(·)b are used to introduce the
concept of virtual tags. This concept is needed since
otherwise SendTag(·, ·)b would have to accept two
tag/message pairs and select one of them based on the
value of the bit b. In this case it would be trivial to
determine b for multi-pass protocols, simply by using
different right (or left) tags for each pass of the protocol.
For instance, SendTag(T0, T1)b for the first pass and
SendTag(T0, T2)b for all consecutive passes. The proto-
col would only succeed if b = 0, thus allowing detection
of the bit b. Hence, it is crucial that the same tag is always
used within a certain protocol run, which can be ensured
by using virtual tag identifiers.
• A separate communication oracle for tags and reader is
used, since the reader is not considered as an entity whose
privacy can be compromised.
• Corrupt(·): corruption is done with respect to a tag,
not a virtual tag. If Corrupt(·)b would accept a vtag,
then determining the bit b becomes trivial by performing
the following attack:
– vtagi ← DrawTag(T0,T1)
– Ci ← Corrupt(vtagi)b
– Free(vtagi)
– vtagj ← DrawTag(T0,T2)
– Cj ← Corrupt(vtagj)b
If Ci = Cj then b = 0, otherwise b = 1.
We believe that it is realistic to assume that one has the
tag identifier Ti when corrupting a tag, since corruption
implies having physical access to a tag.
• The introduction of CreateInsider(·) and two new
privacy notions (wide-weak-insider and wide-forward-
insider): this models the case where an adversary uses
the internal state a corrupted tag to attack the privacy of
other tags.
• Allowing for a set of readers R and the introduction
of CorruptReader(Rj): with multiple readers, the
probability that one will be corrupted (or is curious
about the tag owner) rises. Even when a reader gets
compromised, only the tag should be able to authenticate
to the other readers is it registered with. Furthermore, the
tag’s identity should remain private when authenticating
to other readers.
V. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we give an overview of previously proposed
protocols that are based on public key cryptography. Each of
these protocols is correct, sound and achieves at least narrow-
strong privacy. The reason why symmetric protocols are not
considered is twofold: for private RFID symmetric authen-
tication protocols 1) Vaudenay [9] proved that narrow-strong
privacy cannot be achieved and 2) Damga˚rd and Pedersen [17]
showed that privacy comes at the cost of a non-scalable lookup
procedure at the reader.
8A. Zero Knowledge Based Protocols
These protocols are proofs of knowledge for a specific
verifier (reader) with public key Y = yP . The prover (tag)
proves knowledge of the private key x ∈ Zℓ, which is the
discrete logarithm of the corresponding public key X = xP ,
for P a publicly agreed-on generator of Gℓ. The public key
X of the tag will serve as its identity and has been registered
with the reader.
1) Randomized Schnorr: Bringer et al. [29] proposed Ran-
domized Schnorr (see Fig. 2). It achieves extended soundness
and narrow-strong privacy.
State: x, Y
Tag T
Secrets: y DB : {Xi}
Reader R
r1, r2 ∈R Zℓ
R1 = r1P,R2 = r2Y
e ∈R Zℓ
e
s = ex + r1 + r2
X˙ = e−1(sP −R1 − y
−1R2)
verify: X˙ ∈ DB.
Figure 2. Randomized Schnorr [29].
2) Randomized Hashed GPS: Later, Bringer et al. [23] pro-
posed Randomized Hashed GPS (see Fig. 3). The protocol has
extended soundness and narrow-strong privacy. The authors
also claim wide-PI-forward privacy, i.e., wide-forward privacy
even when the list of registered tags’ identities is known.
State: x, Y
Tag T
Secrets: y DB : {Xi}
Reader R
r1, r2 ∈R Zℓ
R1 = r1P,R2 = r2Y
z = H(R1, R2)
e ∈R Zℓ
e
R1, R2, s = ex + r1 + r2
X˙ = e−1(sP − R1 − y
−1R2)
Verify: z = H(R1, R2), X˙ ∈ DB.
Figure 3. Randomized Hashed GPS [23].
Privacy-wise, both Randomized Schnorr and Randomized
Hashed GPS suffer from the adversary having complete free-
dom over the exam e it sends to the tag and the fact that
the final message from the tag s contains a term that is
linearly dependent on this exam and the secret of the tag
x. For this reason these protocols cannot be wide-strong
private.6 Furthermore, there exist a linear relation between the
commitments (R1, R2) and the answer s. This, together with
6An attacker in the middle sends e− 1 to the virtual tag and responds to
the reader with s + x. For a correct guess of the tag’s identity with known
internal state x, the result oracle returns 1.
the above, makes that Randomized Schnorr cannot be wide-
weak private.7 Randomized Schnorr and Randomized Hashed
GPS are also vulnerable to insider-attacks.8
3) IBIHOP: Peeters et al. [30] proposed IBIHOP (see
Fig. 4). It achieves extended soundness, (reader-first) mutual
authentication and wide-strong privacy.
State: x, Y
Tag T
Secrets: y DB : {Xi}
Reader R
e ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
xcoord(E) = xcoord(e−1P )
r ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
xcoord(R) = xcoord(rP )
f = xcoord(yR) + e
e = f − xcoord(rY )
eE
?
= P
s = ex + r
X˙ = e−1(sP − R)
?
∈ DB
Figure 4. The IBIHOP protocol [30].
B. Public Key Encryption Based Protocols
The reader has a public/private key pair (PK, pk). The
identities ID of tags that registered are stored in the reader’s
database. The tag and reader share a symmetric key K .
1) Vaudenay’s Public Key Protocol: This protocol proposed
by Vaudenay [9] (see Fig. 5) requires the tag to compute
the public key encryption of one message. This cryptosystem
needs to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA2) to have a secure identification scheme that
achieves wide-strong privacy. One of the most efficient IND-
CCA2 cryptosystems in the standard model is DHIES [13].
State: ID,K, PK
Tag T
Secrets: pk,KM DB : {IDi}
Reader R
a ∈R {0, 1}
α
a
c = EncPK(ID||K||a)
˙ID||K˙||a˙ = Decpk(c)
Verify: a = a˙,
K˙ = FKM (
˙ID),
˙ID ∈ DB.
Figure 5. Vaudenay’s Public Key RFID Protocol [9].
7For an observed protocol run pi0, an adversary can test, using the result
oracle, that the current virtual tag is the tag of pi0. The adversary mounts a
Man-In-The-Middle attack, sends to the reader (R1 + R1,0, R2 + R2,0),
challenges the tag with e− e0 and returns to the reader s + s0.
8Similar to the above. The attacker sends the exam e0 to the virtual tag in
protocol run pi1. When subtracting the answers s0 − s1, the tag specific part
should cancel out. The attacker starts a protocol run pi2 between its insider
tag (with private key x′) and the reader. The attacker sets R1 = R1,0−R1,1,
R2 = R2,0 − R2,1 and replies with s′ = s0 − s1 + e2x′.
92) Hash ElGamal Based Protocol: Canard et al. [10] pro-
posed a hash ElGamal-based protocol (see Fig. 6), which is se-
cure, narrow-strong private and future untraceable. It is unclear
how future untraceability (as defined by Canard et al. [10])
and wide-strong privacy relate to each other, however, these
seem to be closely related. This protocol uses an IND-CPA
cryptosystem, Hash ElGamal; and a MAC algorithm. It is
more efficient than Vaudenay’s public key scheme since the
underlying encryption does not need to be IND-CCA2. Note
that the combination of a MAC and IND-CPA encryption used
in this specific protocol in fact provides IND-CCA2 encryption
for the type of plaintext messages used [31].
State: ID,K, Y
Tag T
Secrets: y DB : {IDi,Ki}
Reader R
a ∈R Zℓ
a
b, r ∈R Zℓ
T0 = MAC(a||b,K)
T1 = (T0||ID||b)⊕H(rY )
T2 = rP
T1, T2
T˙0|| ˙ID||b˙ = T1 ⊕H(yT2)
Get K˙ from DB( ˙ID)
Verify: T˙0 = MAC(a||b˙, K˙).
Figure 6. Hash ElGamal Based Protocol [10].
Neither protocol achieves extended soundness. Tag and
reader need to store some shared (secret) data: an identifier
ID and a shared secret key K . Both protocols achieve wide-
strong privacy and soundness can also be proven under the
more strict definition of matching conversations. Wide-strong
privacy rules out insider attacks on privacy.
VI. NEW WIDE-FORWARD-INSIDER PROTOCOL
Our proposed protocol (see Fig. 7) is a modified version of
the Schnorr [32] identification protocol. The original protocol
is proven secure by Bellare and Palacio [33] under the OMDL
assumption. Our starting point is a variant of the Schnorr
identification protocol, where the exam of the reader is applied
to the tag’s randomness instead of its secret. This variant is
equivalent to the original protocol, except for the case that
e = 0. In the original Schnorr identification protocol this
results in the adversary learning the tag’s randomness while
in the variant the adversary will learn the tag’s secret. This
situation is avoided by having the tag check that e 6= 0.
Privacy is ensured by introducing a blinding factor d that
can only be computed by the tag and the reader. The blinding
factor is applied to the secret x. It is important to note that
the factor that is applied to the secret, only depends on input
of the tag and the public key of the reader (known to the
tag). As such an adversary cannot influence this value. This is
an important difference with two of the previously proposed
zero-knowledge based protocols (see Sect. V-A) for which the
adversary can choose the factor that is applied to the secret of
the tag,9 leading to insider attacks against privacy.
9Due to IBIHOP’s reader-first mutual authentication, an adversary cannot
choose or even influence the value e.
State: x, Y = yP
Tag T
Secrets: y DB : {Xi = xiP}
Reader R
r1, r2 ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
R1 = r1P,R2 = r2P
e ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
e
d = xcoord(xcoord(r2Y )P )
s = dx+ er1
d˙ = xcoord(xcoord(yR2)P )
X˙ = d˙−1(sP − eR1) ∈ DB ?
Figure 7. Wide-forward-insider private RFID identification protocol.
We will now discuss the protocol in detail. The tag generates
two random numbers r1 and r2, where the former is needed
for extended soundness and the latter is used to ensure privacy.
The tag commits to its randomness by sending R1, R2 to the
reader. The reader verifies that R1, R2 6= O, for O the point at
infinity. The tag’s response is s = dx+er1, with d the blinding
factor as computed by the tag. Note that the tag must check
that d, e 6= 0.10 The reader verifies that a tag with public key
X˙ = d˙−1(sP − eR1), with d˙ the blinding factor as computed
by the reader, has been registered. The reader keeps a list
of all incomplete sessions. If a session timeout occurs or the
tag fails to identify for a given challenge, the session is also
considered to be completed.
The blinding factor contains r2Y = yR2. Given the CDH
assumption, this value can only be computed when given
either r2 or y. To prevent an adversary of exploiting the self-
reducibility of the DL problem, this value is encapsulated in
a one-way function. Minimising the required circuit area for
implementation was one of the design criteria. Instead of using
a cryptographic hash function, we choose a one-way function
that only uses EC operations: H(r2Y ) = xcoord(r2Y )P .
The one-wayness of this function follows directly from the
DL assumption. The value d is set to the x-coordinate of the
EC point.
A. Correctness
Theorem 1. The protocol is correct according to Def. 10.
Proof. Since d = xcoord(xcoord(r2Y )P ) =
xcoord(xcoord(yR2)P ) = d˙, it follows that
X˙ = d˙−1(sP − eR1) = d
−1((dx+ er1)P − er1P ) = X .
B. Soundness
Theorem 2. The proposed protocol has extended soundness
according to Def. 11 under the OMDL assumption.
Proof. Assume an adversary A that can break the extended
soundness with non-negligible probability, i.e. that can per-
form a fresh, valid authentication with the verifier. Without
10By appropriate selection of the elliptic curve (e.g. a curve without points
(0, y)), checking d 6= 0 is not necessary if R2 6= O.
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loss of generality we will assume the target tag is known at
the start of the game.11 We construct an adversary B that wins
the OMDL game as follows:
• Set X = O1(). X will be used as the public key of the
target tag.
• B executes A. During the first phase of A, B simulates
the SendTag oracles for the target tag as follows (all
other oracles are simulated as per protocol specification):
– On the first SendTag(vtag)b query of the i’th
protocol run: return R2,i = r2,iP with r2,i ∈R Zℓ
and R1,i = O1().
– On the second SendTag(vtag, ei)b query of the i’th
protocol run: set di = xcoord(xcoord(r2,iY )P )
and return si = O2(diX + eiR1,i)
• During the second phase of A, B proceeds as follows:
– On the first call of A to Result(π), com-
pute d = xcoord(xcoord(yR2)P ) and store
(s, d). Next, rewind A until right before the call
to SendReader(π,R1, R2). On the next call to
SendReader(π,R1, R2), return a new random e′.
– On the next call of A to Result(π): compute
r1 = (s−s
′)/(e−e′) and x = d−1(s − er1) return
(x, e−11 (s1 − xd1), . . . , e
−1
k (sk − xdk)).
The simulation by B is perfect during both phases. At the
end of the game B will successfully win the OMDL with
non-negligible probability, unless s = s′, which happens with
negligible probability since both e and e′ are randomly chosen
after R2 6= O is fixed.
C. Privacy
Before giving the privacy proof we introduce a crucial
conjecture that is used as building block for obtaining wide-
forward-insider privacy.
Conjecture 1. Assume a set X = {x1, . . . , xn} and I =
{ι1, . . . , ιm} with xi, ιj ∈R Zℓ and n,m polynomial in the
security parameter. We conjecture that a PPT adversary has
negligible probability in winning the following game:
1) b ∈R {0, 1}.
2) The adversary A is given I and can interact with the
system through the following oracles:
• O1(α, β) :=
{
(i, dixα) if b = 0
(i, dixβ) if b = 1
with di ∈R Zℓ and let i be a counter that is
incremented at every call
• O2(s, i) := d
−1
i s ∈ X ∪ I
• O3(s) := s ∈ X
12
11Otherwise, the proof can be adapted by choosing the public keys of the
tags as Xi = O1(). All tag queries are simulated as for the target tag, until
the tag is corrupted. When corrupting a tag, call O2(Xi) for that tag and use
the result as private key for simulating all following queries to that tag. At
the end of the game, use the O2(·) oracle to extract all remaining discrete
logarithms, except for the target tag.
12Due to a technicality in the privacy proof, we need to replace this
oracle by O3(S) := dlog(S) ∈ X . Note that it is the challenger, which
is computationally unbounded, that computes the discrete logarithm in this
oracle. This definition is equivalent to the one given here, since the adversary
can always call O3 with sP instead of s.
3) The adversary A is given X and outputs a bit g.
The adversary wins the game if b == g.
The intuition behind the experiment described above is that
the adversary has a set of insider tags for which it knows the
secret keys (I) and that there is a set of tags for which the
keys remains secret (X ). Through O1 the adversary can obtain
output of the non-corrupted tags, which is a random value
multiplied with the tag secret. Just as in the privacy definition,
a random bit determines which tag secret xi is selected. Since
a fresh random value di is multiplied with every tag output,
it is obvious that the adversary has negligible advantage in
winning the game when only given O1. The oracles O2 and
O3 let the adversary verify the tag output. Both oracles only
return a binary value indicating whether validation succeeded.
The random di’s are used in O2 to verify the input. Intuitively,
the only way that the adversary can win the game is by either
guessing some xi and checking it through oracle O3 or by
giving an input (s, i) to O2 that did not directly originate
from a call to O1 (i.e. that maps to a different xi than the call
to O1 did). The probability of both these events happening
however seems negligible.
Theorem 3. The proposed protocol is wide-forward-insider
and narrow-strong private according to Def. 9 under the ODH
assumption, the XL assumption and Conjecture 1.
Proof. Assume an adversary A that wins the privacy game
with non-negligible advantage. Using a standard hybrid ar-
gument [34], [35], we construct an adversary that breaks the
ODH-assumption. We set Y = B. Bi plays the privacy game
with A. Bi selects a random bit b˜, which will indicate which
world is simulated to A. All oracles are simulated in the
regular way, with the exception of the SendTag and Result
oracle for the target tag:
• SendTag(vtag)b:
– j 6= i: Generate r1, r2 ∈R Zℓ. Take R1 = r1P,R2 =
r2P . Return R1 and R2.
– j = i: Generate r1 ∈R Zℓ. Take R1 = r1P,R2 = A.
Return R1 and R2.
• SendTag(vtag, e)b, j’th query: retrieve the tuple
(vtag, T0, T1) from the table D. Take the key x for tag
Tb˜.
– j < i: Generate r ∈R Zℓ. Take d =
xcoord(H(rP )). Return s = dx+ er1.
– j = i: Take d = xcoord(H(C)). Return s = dx+
er1.
– j > i: Take d = xcoord(H(r2Y )). Return s =
dx+ er1.
• Result(π): If the received R2 in session π matches A
from the ODH problem take d˙ = xcoord(H(C)). If not,
check if R2 matches any of the R2’s generated during
the first i− 1 SendTag queries. If so, use the r gener-
ated in that query and compute d˙ = xcoord(H(rP )).
Otherwise, take d˙ = xcoord(O(R2)). Finally, compute
X˙ = d˙−1(sP −eR1). Check X˙ with the database, return
true if X˙ is found, false otherwise.
At the end of the game A outputs its guess g for the privacy
game. Bi outputs (b˜ == g).
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The above simulation to A is perfect, since validation is
done in the same way as the protocol specification. If R2 = A,
the oracle O(·) cannot be used. However, in this case we know
the corresponding value of d by directly using H(C), which
gives the same result.
We use Ai (with i ∈ [1 . . . k]) to denote the case that A
runs with the first i SendTag queries random instances, and
the other queries real instances. This is the case when Bi+1
runs with a real ODH instance, or Bi with a random ODH
instance. Note that Ai wins if b˜ == g.
By the hybrid argument we get that:
‖Pr
[
A0 wins
]
− Pr
[
Ak wins
]
‖ ≤
∑
AdvBi .
• In the case of A0, it is clear Pr
[
A0 wins
]
= Pr [Awins]
since all oracles are simulated exactly as in the protocol
definition.
• In the case of Ak, all SendTag queries are simulated
with r ∈R Zℓ and d = xcoord(xcoord(rP )P ). Under
the XL assumption it follows that d is indistinguishable
from a random value from the x-coordinate distribution
and that d is independent of R1, R2 and e.
a) Narrow-strong privacy: Since s = dx + er1 and
R1 = r1P , it follows under the XL assumption that (s, e, R1),
with d a random value from the x-coordinate distribution, is
indistinguishable from (r˜, e, R), with r˜ a uniformly random
value. Hence it follows that s is indistinguishable from a
uniformly random value independent of x, as long as e, d 6= 0.
Note that this only holds in the absence of a Result oracle
(which is able to distinguish r˜ from random).
So Ak has probability 1/2 of winning the privacy game,
since it obtains no information at all on x from a tag.
‖Pr
[
A0 wins
]
− Pr
[
Ak wins
]
‖ = ‖Pr [Awins]− 1
2
‖
=
1
2
AdvprivacyA
≤
∑
AdvBi
It follows that at least one of the Bi has non-negligible
probability to win the ODH game.
b) Wide-forward-insider privacy: For proving wide-
forward-insider privacy, we also have to simulate the Result
oracle, which was ommitted in the case of narrow-strong pri-
vacy. We can now do a straightforward reduction to the game
from Conjecture 1. All SendTag(vtag, e)b calls are simulated
using O1(i, j) for the tags Ti and Tj passed to DrawTag.
Calls to Result are simulated using O2(sP − eR1, i) if the
R1 received by the server matches an R1 resulting from a
SendTag(vtag)b, otherwise d˙ is computed as in the original
protocol and O3(d˙−1(sP − eR1)) is used to validate the
resulting secret.
VII. EFFICIENCY OPTIMISATION
The protocol will be optimised by reducing the computa-
tional effort at the tag side. This is done by having the tag
only generate one random value r (r1 = r2). As such, the tag
has to compute one less scalar-EC point multiplication and
has to transmit one less element. We also change the blinding
factor to d = xcoord(rY ). This reduces the computational
effort required from the tag with another scalar-EC point
multiplication. An overview of the protocol is given in Fig. 8.
State: x, Y
Tag T
Secrets: y DB : {Xi}
Reader R
r ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
R = rP
e ∈R Z
∗
ℓ
e
d = xcoord(rY )
s = d+ x + er
d˙ = xcoord(yR)
X˙ = (sP − d˙P − eR) ∈ DB ?
Figure 8. Optimised protocol.
A. Soundness
Theorem 4. The optimised protocol has extended soundness
according to Def. 12 under the OMDL assumption.
The proof is similar to the one of the original protocol.
B. Privacy
For the privacy proofs, an extended ODH variant is required.
To be able to verify the tag’s response, we only need dP =
xcoord(rY )P , which is already available in the original
ODH by oracle O(Z) = H(bZ). However, to also be able to
compute s, in the case that R = A, the value xcoord(C)+ea
is required. In our extended ODH variant, the adversary has
access to the oracle O′(z) := xcoord(C) + za that can
be called once with z 6= 0, in addition to A = aP,B =
bP,xcoord(C)P and the oracle O(Z) of the original ODH.
Theorem 5. The optimised protocol is narrow-strong and
wide-forward-insider private according to Def. 9 under our
extended ODH assumption and the additive variant of Conj.1.
Proof. Assume an adversary A that wins the privacy game
with non-negligible advantage. Using a hybrid argument we
construct an adversary that breaks the ODH-assumption. We
set Y = B. Bi plays the privacy game with A. Bi selects a
random bit b˜, which will indicate which world is simulated
to A. All oracles are simulated in the regular way, with the
exception of the SendTag and Result oracle for the target
tag:
• SendTag(vtag)b:
– j 6= i: Generate r ∈R Zℓ. Take R = rP . Return R.
– j = i: Take R = A. Return R.
• SendTag(vtag, e)b, j’th query: retrieve the tuple
(vtag, T0, T1) from the table D. Take the key x for tag
Tb˜.
– j < i: Generate r′ ∈R Zℓ. Take d = xcoord(r′P ).
Return s = x+ er + d.
– j = i: Return s = x+O′(e).
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– j > i: Take d = xcoord(rY ). Return s = x+ er+
d.
• Result(π): If the received R in session π matches A
from the ODH problem take d˙P = xcoord(C)P . If not,
check if R matches any of the R’s generated during the
first i− 1 SendTag queries. If so, use the r′ generated
in that query and compute d˙P = xcoord(r′P )P .
Otherwise, take d˙P = O(R). Finally, compute X˙ =
sP − eR − d˙P . Check X˙ with the database, return true
if X˙ is found, false otherwise.
At the end of the game A outputs its guess g for the privacy
game. Bi outputs (b˜ == g).
The above simulation to A is perfect, since validation
is done in the same way as the protocol specification. If
R = A, the oracle O(·) cannot be used. However, in this
case we know the corresponding value of dP by directly using
xcoord(C)P , which gives the same result.
We use Ai (with i ∈ [1 . . . k]) to denote the case that A
runs with the first i SendTag queries random instances, and
the other queries real instances. This is the case when Bi+1
runs with a real ODH instance, or Bi with a random ODH
instance. Note that Ai wins if b˜ == g.
By the hybrid argument we get that:
‖Pr
[
A0 wins
]
− Pr
[
Ak wins
]
‖ ≤
∑
AdvBi .
• In the case of A0, it is clear Pr
[
A0 wins
]
= Pr [Awins]
since all oracles are simulated exactly as in the protocol
definition.
• In the case of Ak, all SendTag queries are simulated
with r ∈R Zℓ and d = xcoord(rP ).
a) Narrow-strong privacy: Since s = x + er + d and
R = rP , it follows under the XL assumption that (s, e, R),
with d a random value from the x-coordinate distribution, is
indistinguishable from (r˜, e, R), with r˜ a uniformly random
value. Hence it follows that s is indistinguishable from a
uniformly random value independent of x, as long as e, d 6= 0.
So Ak has probability 1/2 of winning the privacy game,
since it obtains no information at all on x from a tag.
‖Pr
[
A0 wins
]
− Pr
[
Ak wins
]
‖ = ‖Pr [Awins]−
1
2
‖
=
1
2
AdvprivacyA
≤
∑
AdvBi
It follows that at least one of the Bi has non-negligible
probability to win the ODH game.
b) Wide-forward-insider privacy: For proving wide-
forward-insider privacy, we also have to simulate the Result
oracle, which was ommitted in the case of narrow-strong
privacy. We can now do a straightforward reduction to
the game from (the additive variant of) Conjecture 1. All
SendTag(vtag, e)b calls are simulated using O1(i, j) for
the tags Ti and Tj passed to DrawTag. Calls to Result
are simulated using O2() if the R1 received by the server
matches an R1 resulting from a SendTag(vtag)b, otherwise
d˙ is computed as in the original protocol and O3() is used to
validate the resulting secret.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
Our protocol mainly requires the evaluation of scalar-
EC point multiplications and the generation of a random
number. For 80 bit security, we need an elliptic curve over a
field that is approximately 160 bits in size. The protocol can be
implemented on the architecture proposed by Lee et al. [36].
Their ECC coprocessor can be built with less than 15 kGEs
(Gate Equivalent), consumes ±13, 8µW of power and takes
around 85 ms for one scalar-EC point multiplication. More
recently, Wenger and Hutter[37] proposed an ECC coprocessor
that only requires 9 kGEs, consumes ±32, 3µW of power and
takes around 286 ms for one scalar-EC point multiplication.
Aside from the ECC coprocessor, circuit area is required
for the ROM (Read Only Memory), RAM (Random Access
Memory) and RNG (Random Number Generator).
A. (Non-)Sense of Coupons
Several papers have proposed to use precomputation as an
optimisation. The protocol is split in an off-line and on-line
phase, for which the on-line phase is more efficient (faster)
than the original protocol. The precomputed values are stored
in the form of coupons. There are two options: either these
coupons are precomputed externally and pushed on the tag or
the tag generates these coupons itself.
Computing coupons externally has the additional benefit
that for most protocols, less logic needs to be implemented
on the tag. The downside of the tag itself not being able
to do these necessary computations is that an adversary can
quite easily mount a denial of service attack, by tricking
the tag into authenticating over and over until it has no
coupons left. This attack could be prevented by introducing
mutual authentication, more specifically have the reader first
authenticate to the tag. Ironically the only efficient way to
achieve authentication of the reader to a yet-unknown tag, is
by using zero knowledge proofs, which in turn require a full
fletched ECC coprocessor on the tag to verify these. How to
securely push these coupons onto the tag is an additional issue.
Having the tag itself precompute coupons can speed up the
identification process, or alternatively make it possible to use
a slower EC coprocessor that is smaller. The tag computes
these coupons whenever energy is available. A tag can draw
energy as long as it is in the electromagnetic field around any
reader. Since the tag can do all the necessary computations
itself, one only needs limited storage for b coupons.
The disadvantage of coupons is that these need to be stored
on the tag. When making abstraction of the control logic
needed to access this storage, one still needs about one floating
gate per bit. The size of the coupons can be minimized by
not storing the used randomness but instead implementing
a pseudo-random function with a seed to generate random
numbers on the tag. Taking this optimisation into account,
the protocols discussed in this paper still require coupons that
consist of two EC points. For an area of 10 KGe (≈ the size
of Wenger and Hutter’s ECC coprocessor) one can store 20 to
30 of such coupons.
In general it can be argued that strong privacy is not
achievable when using coupons or a pseudo-random function
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instead of a true random number generator. By making a query
to the Corrupt oracle, the adversary learns the complete
internal state of the tag, which also comprises coupons and/or
the seed of the pseudo-random function. When the coupons
are generated by the tag itself, b-strong privacy is possible,
meaning that the tag is unlinkable again after b conversations
from the moment the tag was freed.
At least part of the coupons is reader specific. This puts
an additional burden on tag storage requirements in the multi-
reader setting, making the use of coupons impractical.
B. Comparison
Table I gives a comparision of our protocol to previously
proposed protocols, described in Sect. V.
Both the Randomized Schnorr and our proposed protocol
benefit from a compact hardware design: only an ECC co-
processor is needed. The other protocols require additional
hardware to evaluate a cryptographic hash function, which
makes the design substantially larger. Current cryptographic
hash functions [38] require at least 50% of the circuit area of
the most compact ECC implementation.
The scalar-EC point multiplication is more complex than
the evaluation of a hash/MAC. For a fair comparison between
the performance of protocols that require the evaluation of a
hash/MAC and protocols that do not, one should assume the
same total available circuit size. This means that our protocol
can be implemented using a larger but faster ECC processor.
When also considering the more general setting, where
a single tag can identify the end-user privately to multiple
readers, the tags not only need to store an extra public key
for every reader but also corresponding shared data, if any.
In this setting there is a clear advantage for protocols that
provide extended soundness, since the tag can use the same
private/public key pair to identify to each reader.
IX. CONCLUSION
RFID privacy was approached from both the modelling
and protocol point of view. Several RFID privacy models
were critically examined with respect to their assumptions,
practical usability and other issues that arise when applying
their privacy definition to concrete protocols. Some models
are based on unrealistic assumptions, others are impractical
to apply. We presented a new RFID privacy model, based
on the classic notion of indistinguishability, that combines
the benefits of existing models while avoiding their identified
drawbacks. Since this privacy model is based on an indistin-
guishability game, one can rely on a wide range of existing
proof techniques, making the model quite straightforward
to use in practice. Furthermore, this is the first model that
allows for a more general setting where a tag can privately
authenticate to multiple (independent) readers. This model
also incorporates the creation of insider tags, in order to also
capture privacy attacks for which the corrupted tag is not the
one under attack. We showed that the combination of the
notions narrow-strong and wide-forward-insider is sufficient
for most practical applications.
From the protocol side, we examined several protocols
towards their security and privacy properties. We proposed
a new wide-forward-insider and narrow-strong private zero-
knowledge RFID identification protocol and its optimised
version. Security and privacy of our proposed protocols are
proven in the standard model. Our protocol is the most
efficient privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocol for
most practical applications and can be implemented on the
tags, using only Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This allows for a
compact hardware design and requires minimal computational
effort from the tag, namely two scalar-EC point multiplica-
tions. As an additional benefit, our protocols do not require
any shared secrets between readers and tags. This makes these
protocols very suitable for use with multiple readers.
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